



The Federal Ministry
for the Environment,
Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safety

Session 5: Legal Treatment of Allowances EU ETS/Germany

**2nd Seminar on “Sharing Experiences on Legal
Development and Implementation of ETS”
Bangkok, 11 June 2019**


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- I. Legal nature/treatment of allowances**
- II. Balance sheet treatment**
- III. Treatment in the law on collateral security**




I. Legal nature of allowances



Legal nature controversial




I. Legal nature of allowances





I. Legal nature of allowances Trading/Flow of allowances






I. Legal nature of allowances


Market Shares 2018

Secondary Market Trading (Exchange)



■ ICE ■ EEX ■ NOMX

Primary Market Auctions



■ ICE ■ EEX



I. Legal nature of allowances

Treatment for oversight purposes

- EU ETS emissions trading oversight is embedded into the already **existing financial markets infrastructure** (legislation and structures)
- The lion's share of transactions is in the form of **derivatives** (futures, forwards, options), which are subject to **EU financial markets regulation** (including MiFID II / MiFIR, MAR)
- **Spots** are subject to equivalent rules at the EU level as of 2018
- **Series of fraudulent activities** was experienced by the market a few years ago → however, these could not be directly attributed to the EU emission allowances market (e.g. phishing, tax fraud)
- Overall aim of the latest reform is the **enhancement of the market's overall transparency** both in terms of data publicly available to all participants and the information submitted to supervisors



I. Legal nature of allowances

Treatment for oversight purposes

- **MiFID II** regulates the **provisions of investment services** and **trading venues** in the EU.
- National transposition takes place in the German Exchange Act (BörsG) and the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG).
- **Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (MiFIR)** sets directly applicable rules for: trading venue transparency, trade reporting and transaction reporting.
- MiFID II and MiFIR are **complemented by several delegated acts**, regulatory standards and guidelines/FAQs.
- **Main purpose** is to ensure that trading in financial instruments is carried out as far as possible on **organised venues**.



II. Balance sheet treatment

Issued free
of charge

Valued at 1 € at
the time of
issue (reminder)

Valuation at
“fair cost”

Purchased

Valuation at
acquisition cost



III. Law on Collateral Security

Pledge not possible

- No entry of the lien in the registry possible

Security transfer possible

- Full legal right to secure a loan is transferred to the creditor by agreement and registration.



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Thank you for your attention

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Session 6: Litigation on ETS

**2nd Seminar on “Sharing Experiences on Legal
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EU-ETS and Lawsuits

- **High willingness for litigation**, especially in Germany
- Possible reasons:
 - “Continuation of policy-making with other means“
 - Distributional conflict, individual justice and equality: specific allocation rules might lead to different treatment between operators
 - Duty to go to court is often obligatory because of management liability rules
- Contribution to the evolution of the EU ETS



Legality of the ETS

Facts I

- **EU ETS framework** established by European **Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EC (ETD)** in 2003; **Phase I 2005-2007**; **key requirements and obligations**
 - **Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permit** & approved **Monitoring Plan (MP)**
 - **Monitoring & reporting** of annual emissions
 - **Submitting** a (verified) **Annual Emissions Report (AER)** regarding the previous year **by 31 March**
 - **Surrendering allowances** to **cover the emissions**
- **ETD transposed** into national law by **Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Act (Treibhausgas-Emissionshandelsgesetz)** in 2004



Legality of the ETS

Facts II

- **Operators** of installations covered by the EU ETS **challenged the new requirements/obligations**
- **Companies claimed** new **obligations** would **infringe fundamental rights** (e.g. **property**):
 - Construction and operation of an **installation** that could have a **harmful impact on the environment** (e.g. pollution, noise etc.) is subject to a **permit** requirement under **Federal Immission Control Act**
 - By **obtaining this permit** before a **legitimate expectation** was **created**



Legality of the ETS Judgement

- **Federal Administrative Court of Germany** decided in **2005**:
Implementation of the ETS and its obligations do not constitute a violation of fundamental rights of operators of incumbent installations
- **Reasons:**
 - **ETS obligations** have to be seen **separately** from the **obligations under the Immissions Control Act**
 - **Existing permit** refers to non-GHG emissions and **doesn't grant a right to unlimited emissions**, operators' **obligations** are **"dynamic"**
 - **CO₂ emissions of an installation** are **not prohibited** but **regulated** in an required and proportionate way



Scope & Competitiveness Facts I

Gases

Initially, the EU ETS focused on CO₂
N₂O and PFCs were added in phase III.

Point of regulation

Downstream

Sectors

Energy: Power and heat generation

Industry: Energy-intensive sectors incl. oil refineries, iron and steel, aluminium, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids, and bulk organic chemicals


Aviation

Thresholds

Energy: > 20 MW total rated thermal input

Industry: Varying thresholds for different sectors;
Small installations with fewer than 25,000 tons of CO₂e may be excluded

Aviation: 10,000t CO₂/year



EU ETS: 11,800 installations & 40 % GHG emissions.



Scope & Competitiveness

Facts II

- Production of **steel** has been **covered** by the **EU ETS** since **Phase I**
- Production of **aluminium** and **plastics (chemical industry)** had **been excluded initially**
- **Steel industry challenged** this claiming:
 - **Non-ferrous metals** and **plastics** are not subject to ETS obligations
 - Products of this sectors may serve as **substitutes to steel** although the **production processes** lead to greenhouse gas **emissions as well**
 - This leads to a **distortion of competition** and constitutes a **breach of the principle of equal treatment**



Scope & Competitiveness Judgement

- **ECJ (European Court of Justice) decided in 2008:**
The Emissions Trading Directives' approach to **exempt certain sectors from the scope does not violate the principle of equal treatment.**
- **Reasons:**
 - **Steel, non-ferrous metals and chemical sectors** are in a **comparable position** regarding the aim of the ETS while being **treated differently**
 - In general, all **relevant competitors have to be covered** by ETS to **avoid unjust market distortions**
 - However, a **“step-by-step approach“** to enlarge the ETS scope is **reasonable and justified**



Phasing-in Auctioning Facts I

- **ETD 2003/87/EC** stipulated that Member States have to **allocate allowances in Phase I and II mainly free of charge** :
 - Phase I: 95 %
 - Phase II: 90 %
- **Phase I Germany:**
 - **100 % free of charge** (grandfathering, benchmarking)
 - Liberalised **electricity market** with **very low level of competition**
 - **Windfall profits** for **electricity** producers **passing through** the **(opportunity) costs**



Phasing-in Auctioning Facts II

- **Phase II Germany to phase-in auctioning**
 - **40 Mt CO₂** (8 % of the cap) **have been auctioned per year**
 - **Allocation** for electricity producers was **determined based on benchmarking**
 - 750 g CO₂ per kWh for solid fuels
 - 365 g CO₂ per kWh for gaseous/liquid fuels
 - **Allocation** amount of **each power producer** has been **reduced by 15 %** to be auctioned instead
- **Power sector challenged the the auctioning approach claiming**
 - State is **not allowed** to auction the „use of air/atmosphere“ and **violates fundamental rights**




Phasing-in Auctioning Judgement

- **Federal Administrative Court of Germany** decided in **2012**
Phasing-in auctioning of allowances for electricity producers is proportionate and therefore justified.
- **Reasons:**
 - **ETS** aims at putting a **price on CO₂**; to the **disadvantage** of **CO₂-intensive** technologies and to **incentivise low carbon technologies**; **auctioning** is an **efficient** way of carbon pricing
 - **Fundamental rights** of operators have **to be taken into account phasing out free allocation**, but **operators** who **pass through CO₂ costs** **do not need an allocation free of costs**



Excess Emissions Penalty I Facts I



- **Operator** drafts the **Annual Emissions Report (AER)**; **verifier 1** verifies the AER and issues a Verification Report (VR)
- **Verifier 2** **confirms** the total amount of CO₂e emissions in the Union Registry (VET – Verified Emissions Table),
- **Operator 3** **submits** verified **AER** to the **Authority** by 31st March
- **Operator 4** **surrenders allowances** by 30th April



Excess Emissions Penalty I

Facts II

- **Art. 12 (3) ETD 2003/87/EC**

*“... by 30 April each year at the latest, the **operator** of each installation **surrenders a number of allowances (...)** equal to the total **emissions** from that installation **during the preceding calendar year** as verified in accordance with Article 15...”*

- **Art. 16 (3) ETD 2003/87/EC**

*“...operator who **does not surrender sufficient allowances by 30 April to cover its emissions** during the preceding year **shall be held liable for the payment of an excess emissions penalty**. The excess emissions penalty shall be **EUR 100 for each tonne** of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted for which the operator or aircraft operator has not surrendered allowances. (...)”*

- Phase I: 40 €
- Payment **doesn't release operator** from the surrender obligation



Excess Emissions Penalty I

Facts III

- **Two installations** which **didn't surrender allowances at all** by 30 April 2007 to cover the emissions of 2006 (10,000 t & 42,000 t)
- Swedish Environment Protection **Agency imposed the penalties** (EUR 433,120 & EUR 1,697,320)
- **Companies challenged the Penalty claiming they**
 - **Didn't want to circumvent** the surrender **obligation**
 - Had **sufficient allowances on** their registry **accounts** but missed the deadline due to **internal administrative breakdown**



Excess Emissions Penalty I Judgement

- **European Court of Justice decided in 2013:**


The “**excess emissions penalty**” regarding the failure to surrender allowances to cover the emission of the preceding year is **justified, irrespective of the reason for the non-surrender.**

- **Reasons:**

- **Obligation to surrender** allowances plays a **key role** in the **ETS** and for the **integrity** of the instrument
- “Excess Emissions” are all emission not covered by an surrendered allowance by 30 April
- However, “force majeure” making it objectively impossible to comply with the obligation would have to be recognized



Excess Emissions Penalty II Facts I




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Excess Emissions Penalty II

Facts II



- **CA checks AERs and ① asks for clarification**, if required
- If emissions were underestimated the **CA ② may estimate the additional amount of emissions** for the reporting year; **operator may be fined; Excess Emissions Penalty also for reporting mistakes detected after 30 April?**
- **Operators ③ have to surrender additional allowances; CA ④ checks the compliance status**



Excess Emissions Penalty II

Facts III

- In **Germany** the **Excess Emissions Penalty** has **also** been applied on **reporting mistakes**
- If the **authority detected** that the **total verified emissions** have been **understated** operators had to pay the penalty
- **Various companies challenged this practice claiming**
 - Sanctioning practice in Germany is **disproportionate** because it is **imposed regardless of negligence or fault**
 - **Meeting the deadline** for surrender might be **simple**, **avoiding reporting mistakes** is considerably more **difficult**
 - Surrender **obligation** is **determined by the** emissions stated in the independently **verified report**



Excess Emissions Penalty II

Facts IV

- **Art. 12 (3) ETD 2003/87/EC**

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Excess Emissions Penalty II Judgement

- **European Court of Justice decided in 2015:**
The “excess emissions penalty” is precluded if the allowances surrendered equal the verified emissions of the reporting period.
- **Reasons:**
 - **Surrendering allowances** one of the **key obligations**
 - **Emissions Trading Directive** refers to the **verified emissions**
 - To apply the “**excess emissions penalty**” on reporting **mistakes** is **disproportionate** as it **doesn’t take into account the reason** for the misreporting
 - However, a **fault based sanctioning system** should be **established** by Member States for **cases of understated emissions**



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