

# Carbon Pricing Instruments: Carbon tax

Technical Training on Carbon Pricing  
September 26th, 2018


**Gabriel FEUILLET-PALMA**

# INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF CARBON PRICING INITIATIVES

**51 national and subnational jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon in 2018**


**CPI implemented or scheduled would cover 20% of global GHG emissions (11 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e)**

- ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
- Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
- Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration
- ETS implemented or scheduled, carbon tax under consideration
- ETS or carbon tax under consideration
- ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled



# INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF CARBON TAXES


- **23 carbon taxes implemented**
  - 21 carbon taxes implemented at national level
  - 2 carbon taxes implemented at subnational level
- **2.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e covered**
- **3 carbon taxes scheduled for implementation (national level)**
  - Argentina
  - Singapore
  - South Africa



# INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF CARBON TAXES

**SECTORAL COVERAGE AND GHG EMISSIONS COVERED differ from one country to another**


- **Mexico:** covers coal and petroleum
- **France:** covers all fossil fuels for heating and transport
- **Spain:** covers fluorinated GHGs (F-gases) – all sectors



# INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF CARBON TAXES

## CARBON PRICING uneven depending of local contexts

- **Mexico:** US\$ 3 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq (upper) to US\$ 1 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq (lower)
- **France:** US\$ 55 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq
- **Spain:** US\$ 25 tCO<sub>2</sub>ea



# AGENDA

- 1. DEFINING A CARBON TAX**
- 2. CARBON TAX DESIGN**
- 3. UNWANTED EFFECTS: THE MITIGATION MEASURES**



# AGENDA

**1. DEFINING A CARBON TAX**

2. CARBON TAX DESIGN

3. UNWANTED EFFECTS: THE MITIGATION MEASURES



# DEFINING A CARBON TAX


## WHAT IS A CARBON TAX?

- **Environmental policy instrument (standards/CAC, subsidies, and market) to regulate pollution**
  - Set a price to negative environmental (and social) externality
  - Send a signal price to the economic agents (private sector, consumers etc.)
- **Equal the marginal damage costs (Pigouvian tax)**



# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## CARBON TAX EFFECTS



**Point A:** Market is efficient – Supply meets demand.

Market is not socially efficient because negative externalities cost is not accounted for.

⇒ Tax introduced to compensate for the negative effects

Price raises from **P1 to P2** affecting the consumer behavior

Quantity demanded decreases from **Q1 to Q2** reducing the overall externalities generated

Revenue generated can be used to remediate environmental damage or invest in low-impact technologies

**Point B:** Market is socially efficient – External costs have been internalized using the tax.

⇒ **Deadweight loss** in the market is eliminated.



# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## WHY A CARBON TAX?

- **Incent economic agents to internalize negative environmental (and social) externality cost associated with the good's production.**
- **Create a financial incentive to lower the volume of environmental externalities released**
  - **Flexible / High discretion:** CT based on the actual level of emission and not on the means
  - **Certainty** regarding the carbon price over a given period
  - **Government revenue generation:** revenues from CT can be recycled.

# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## CARBON TAX AND EMISSIONS TRADING



MED: Marginal Emissions Damage to the environment

MEB: Marginal Emissions Benefit – mirror image of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve (MACC)

# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## WHEN SELECT A CARBON TAX?

- **LOCAL CONTEXT HIGHLY RELEVANT FOR SELECTING AND ADOPTING GHG POLICY INSTRUMENT**
  - **Economic context**
  - **Emissions profile**
  - **Political feasibility and state of public opinion**
  - **Government capacity and rule of law**




## CONSIDERATIONS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT FOR CARBON TAX ADOPTION:

- **Market-driven economies**
- **Elastic markets**
- **Benefits generated by revenue's recycling**

# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## EMISSIONS PROFILE - RESIDENTIAL SECTOR IN FRANCE

Evolution of greenhouse gas emissions for France between 1990 and 2013



65% for space heating


Breakdown of the GHG emissions generated by residential sector in France in 2015 (SOeS, 2016)

Energy consumption Residential Tertiary sector in France from 1970 to 2007 (SOeS, 2016)


# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## ELASTICITY DEMAND

Low elasticity of demand




High elasticity of demand



# DEFINING A CARBON TAX

## ELASTICITY DEMAND - ROAD TRANSPORT FUEL IN FRANCE



### SHORT TERM

Estimation ST elasticity price in 2006 (Source: INSEE)	Regular	Gasoline	Overall
Excluding seasonal variation adjustment	- 0.46 (0.44)	- 0.17 (0.34)	- 0.36 (0.34)
Including seasonal variation adjustment	- 0.35 (0.45)	- 0.11 (0.34)	- 0.26 (0.27)

### LONG TERM

Estimation LT elasticity price in 2006 (Source: INSEE)	Rural HH	Urban HH
Fuel (€/L)	- 0.74 (0.16) / - 0.78 (0.14)	- 0.91 (0.11) / - 0.93 (0.12)

**In Short Term:** +10% of fuel price leads to -3% [-2.6 to -3.6] of household fuel consumption  
**In Long Term:** +10% of fuel price leads to (i) between -7% to -8% of rural household fuel consumption and (ii) between -8% to -9% of urban household fuel consumption.

# AGENDA

1. DEFINING A CARBON TAX

**2. CARBON TAX DESIGN**

3. UNWANTED EFFECTS: THE MITIGATION MEASURES





# CARBON TAX DESIGN


## STAGES OF CARBON TAX DESIGN

### 1. POLICY OBJECTIVES & NATIONAL CIRCUNSTANCE / CONTEXT

### 2. DESIGN OF THE TAX CARBON

- TAX BASE
- TAX RATE
- INSTITUTIONS
- REVENUES USE
- AVOIDING UNWANTED EFFECTS

### 3. EVALUATION & IMPROVEMENT



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## POLICY OBJECTIVES & NATIONAL CIRCUNSTANCE / CONTEXT

### **Determine policy objectives**

GHG emissions trajectory

Revenue raising etc.



### **Understand national/local context:**

- Emissions profile (overall, sectoral etc.)
- Analyze economic structures
- Analyze governance constraints
- Identify areas of resistance etc.

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## POLICY OBJECTIVES – FRANCE (1/3)

**2007: EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE PACKAGE: 3x20%**

### **2007-2010: GRENELLE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT**

- -38% of energy consumption in existing housing by 2020
- -20% of GHG emissions released by transport sector by 2020
- +23% of renewable energy in final energy consumption by 2020
- Ambition factor 4 by 2050
  - Local climate and energy action plan [TOP DOWN approach]
  - **Climate Energy Contribution (Carbon tax)**

**2014: 2ND EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE PACKAGE: -43% by 2030**  
(2005 baseline) for sectors covered by EU ETS & -30% for other sectors

### **2014: CARBON TAX ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED**

### **2015: ENERGY TRANSITION FOR GG ACT**


- -40% of GHG emissions by 2030 (baseline 1990) and factor 4 by 2050
- -50% of final energy consumption by 2050 (baseline 2012)
- 32% of renewable energy in final energy consumption by 2030

**2017: NATIONAL STRATEGY LOW CARBON: -73% by 2050.**

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## POLICY OBJECTIVES – FRANCE (2/3)

**FRENCH NATIONAL STRATEGY LOW CARBON: -73% of GHG emissions by 2050**



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## POLICY OBJECTIVES – FRANCE (3/3)

*Aims and instruments of public policies  
for a low-carbon strategy*

*Integrating carbon pricing in decision-making*

**Establishing true carbon prices:** eco-tax or emissions trading below an overall limit

**Removing harmful subsidies**

**Encouraging green decision-making:**

- standards
- subsidies and tax credits
- energy savings certificates
- calls for tender

*Removing obstacles to the decarbonisation of the economy*

**Ensuring the acceptability of policies:** compensation and support measures

**Developing information:** nudges, labels and CSR

**Enabling the transformation of the economy**

- R&D, infrastructure, networks
- professional training
- quality of regulations
- finance instruments

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## TAX BASE

- **Scope of taxation**
- **Points of regulation**
- **Legal entity responsible for tax payment**
- **Thresholds**
- **MRV & Administration**
  - Affect the degree of GHG emissions reduction achievable
  - Affect the amount of revenues raiseable
  - Affect sectors, industries concerned

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## SCOPE OF THE TAXATION


- **Targeting fuels**
  - India: only coal
  - Mexico: coal and petroleum
- **Targeting direct emissions**
  - Chile: emissions from large boilers and turbines ( $\geq 50\text{MW}$ )
  - Singapore...
- **GHG emissions to cover**
  - Spain: fluorinated gases (F-gases)

### GHG emissions in Spain in 2012 (UNFCCC)

Total without LULUCF: 340.8 MtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq  
+20.1% since 1990

- CO<sub>2</sub>: 81.2%
- CH<sub>4</sub>: 9.5%
- N<sub>2</sub>O: 7%
- HFCs/PFCs/SF<sub>6</sub>: 2.3%

Emission of F-GHGs in Spain 1995-2014 (Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment)



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## POINTS OF REGULATION

### CRUCIAL FACTORS

- Actors responsive to the signal price
- Administrative and MRV

### UPSTREAM

**Producers and Importers:** France | Ireland | Mexico | Norway...

**Fuel refiners:** South Africa

**Mine mouth:** India | Japan

### MIDSTREAM

**Distributors:** France | Ireland | Spain (F-gases)


**Fuel supplier:** Norway

**HFC, PFC importers:** Norway | Spain


**Electricity utilities:** UK | South Africa

### DOWNSTREAM

**Industrial facilities:** South Africa



Source: Ramseur and Parker 2009.



Source: United States Energy Information Administration 2013




# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## LEGAL ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR TAX PAYMENT

- Depend on the scope
- Depend on the point of regulation

**Schematic view of the carbon tax (F-gases) in Spain**



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## THRESHOLDS

**Minimum level of activity that will trigger responsibility for paying tax**

### **CRUCIAL FACTORS:**

- Proportion of emissions attributable to small emitters
  - Cost of reporting / tax amount
  - Capabilities of private actors and regulators
  - Distortion of competition
- 
- **Chile:** Midstream tax on electricity generators with min. capacity of 50MW.

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## MRV & ADMINISTRATION

### Key considerations:

- **Ability to measure, report and verify emissions**
- **Cost and efforts associated with MRV**

**IDEAL SITUATION:** CT applied to the sectors at the most environmentally effective point

### ▪ **Targeting fossil fuels:**

- Advantage of allowing the CT to “piggyback” on existing customs and excise taxes
- Number of entities: point of regulations in most cases upstream and/or midstream (downstream in case of large facilities that are registered taxpayers)
- Management of exemptions

### ▪ **Targeting direct emissions:**

- Ability to accurately monitor emissions
- Number of entities involved
- Capacity to M&R emissions
- Availability of preexisting systems

# CARBON TAX DESIGN


## TAXE RATE DETERMINATION

- **Approach to set the tax rate**
  - Social cost of carbon approach
  - Abatement target approach (Australia)
  - Revenue target approach (Chile/ Education reforms funding)
  - Benchmarking approach
  - **Political negotiation**
  
- **Tax rate adjustment in the years following the initial implementation**
  - Static carbon tax rate
  - Gradually increasing carbon tax rate
  - Matching with social cost of carbon
  - Adjustment formula
  - Periodic review
  - Ad hoc political approach

# CARBON TAX DESIGN:

## TAXE RATE DETERMINATION

Dynamic curve of abatement costs with a long term objective – residential sector in France



# CARBON TAX DESIGN: TAXE RATE

## CARBON TAX RATE IN FRANCE (1/2)


**2001:** Commission chaired by M. Boiteux €100 (2008 euros) per ton by 2030

**2008:** Commission chaired by A. Quinet decided upon a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €100 (2008 euros) per ton by 2030, adopting a **cost-efficient approach** to hitting emissions reduction targets by 2050.

- Starting price €32 (2008 euros) per tCO<sub>2</sub>eq (consistent with the recommendation from the 2001 commission)
- From 2010 to 2030: +5.8%/year

**2014:** Carbon tax (incorporated into the domestic taxes on fossil fuels) adopted at €7/tCO<sub>2</sub>eq, €14.5/ tCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2015 and €22/tCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2016 [€ 30.5/tCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2017]

**2015:** Energy Transition and Green Growth Act sets a carbon price target of €56 for 2020 and €100 by 2030 (2015 euros).



Trajectory for carbon pricing recommended by the commission chaired by A. Quinet (2008). Source : France Stratégie

**2018:** The 2018 Finance act revises the carbon pricing trajectory as follow:

2018	€44.6
2019	€55
2020	€65.4
2021	€75.8
2022	€86.2

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## CARBON TAX RATE IN FRANCE (2/2)

€44.6/tCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2018 (VAT ex.)

Domestic consumptions taxes on energy products refer to:

- Domestic consumption tax on energy products (TICPE)
- Domestic consumption tax on natural gas (TICGN)
- Domestic consumption tax on coal (TICC)

Domestic consumption taxes collected by **General Directorate of Customs and Excise** (DGDDI) when the products are made available for consumption on the domestic market.

### Evolution of the Domestic consumption taxes on energy products between 2013 and 2017 (Source: MTES, 2017)

VAT excluded	2013	2014 (1er avril)	2015	2016	2017
Gaz naturel (€/MWh PCS)					
- ménages	exemption	1,27	2,64	4,34	4,88
- professionnels	1,19	1,27	2,64	4,34	5,88
Charbon (€/MWh)	1,19	2,29	4,75	7,21	9,99
Gazole (c€/l)	42,84	42,84	46,82	49,81	53,07
Essence E5 (c€/l)	60,69	60,69	62,41	64,12	65,07
Essence E10 (c€/l)	60,69	60,69	62,41	62,12	63,07
Fioul domestique (c€/l)	5,66	5,66	7,64	9,63	11,89
Fioul lourd (c€/kg)	1,85	2,19	4,43	6,88	9,54

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## INSTITUTIONS

- **Institutional arrangements**
  - **Tax liability**
  - **Tax administration**
  - **Tax enforcement**
- **Procedures**
  - **MRV**
  - **Tax assessment and payment**
  - **Claiming rebates**
  - **Audit and inspection**
  - **Investigation and prosecution**
  - **Offsets and specific exemptions**
  - **Carbon tax rules revisions**



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## REVENUES USE

- **Revenue neutrality**
  - **Rebates to households or businesses**
  - **Reductions in other taxes**
  
- **Expanded public spending**
  - **General budget**
  - **Earmarks**
  - **Debt reductions**
  
- **Other: finance offsets**



# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## REVENUE USE

### FRANCE

**2017: €5,600M (€300M in 2014)**

- 3/4 of the revenues contribute to financing “tax credits for encouraging competitiveness and employment” (labor taxes)
- 1/4 used for specific renewable energy/low carbon purposes and tax-affected groups

### SPAIN

**2015: €66M (€31M in 2014)**

- 100% general budget

### JAPAN

**2017: US\$ 2,400M**

- 100% used to promote low-carbon technologies, EE improvements and renewable energy

### CHILE

**2017: US\$ 160M**

- 100% general budget with the ambition to improve the education system

# AGENDA

1. DEFINING A CARBON TAX
2. CARBON TAX DESIGN
3. **UNWANTED EFFECTS: THE MITIGATION MEASURES**



# UNWANTED EFFECTS

**Carbon tax designed to alter the economic costs of certain behaviors that produce GHG emissions.**

- **Carbon leakage** - Increase in emissions in other jurisdiction that do not have equivalent emission-reduction policies.
- **International competitiveness** - increase inputs costs which put covered firms (or sectors) at a competitive disadvantage.
- **Distributional impacts** - unfair or uneven distribution of the carbon tax cost
  - **Income groups:** energy poverty / increase of energy share in low-income household budget, increase of transport budget in rural areas compared with urban areas.
  - **Geographic regions:** energy poverty in regions with harsh climatic conditions / decrease of competitiveness in regions with high concentration of emission-intensive industries.

- ⇒ **Understand the nature of the effects**
- ⇒ **Assess probability of materializing**
- ⇒ **Define and create effective policy to address**

# UNWANTED EFFECTS

## ADDRESS UNWANTED EFFECTS

Unwanted effect	Remedial measures
Leakage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Reducing carbon tax payments:</b> exemptions, reduced tax rates, rebates, offsets.</li><li>• <b>Support measures:</b> reduce the overall financial burden of entities subject to the CT while leaving the signal price to reduce emissions unaffected.</li><li>• <b>Border adjustments and consumptions-based taxation</b></li><li>• <b>Tax-coordinating measures</b></li></ul>
Distributional risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Reducing carbon tax payments:</b> exemptions, reduced tax rates, rebates</li><li>• <b>Support measures:</b> flat payments, (non carbon) tax reductions</li></ul>
International competitiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Reducing carbon tax payments:</b> exemptions, reduced tax rates, rebates, offsets.</li><li>• <b>Support measures:</b> support programs, output-based rebates</li><li>• <b>Border adjustments and consumptions-based taxation</b></li><li>• <b>Tax-coordinating measures</b></li></ul>

Thank you!



# CARBON TAX DESIGN


## FRANCE FAILS TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS IN 2016 & 2017

### Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone - Indicateurs de résultats

**Indicateur n°2 :** Émissions globales de gaz à effet de serre en France

Référence : Indicateur de résultats IR2

Nature de l'indicateur : Indicateur permettant de suivre l'évolution des émissions de gaz à effet de serre en France (émissions territoriales). Cet indicateur n'est pas corrigé des variations climatiques, et n'intègre pas les émissions nettes liées à l'utilisation des terres, aux changements d'affectation des terres et foresterie (UTCATF)




Evolution /objectif : Les émissions de 2015 correspondaient très exactement au budget annuel indicatif prévu dans le scénario de référence de la stratégie nationale bas carbone. Selon les premières estimations, les émissions de 2016 excéderaient le budget annuel indicatif de 3,6 %.

Observations : -

Source : CITEPA (Centre interprofessionnel technique d'études de la pollution atmosphérique)

Fréquence de suivi : annuelle

### Emissions sectorielles estimées en 2016 et objectifs SNBC





# UNWANTED EFFECTS

## ADDRESS UNWANTED EFFECTS

### Measures to address leakage and distributional risks

Measure	Pros	Cons	Examples
Exemptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Straightforward to implement</li><li>• Targeted at affected groups</li><li>• Contingent upon emission reduction agreements</li><li>• Unlikely to present inter. legal challenges</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Negative price signal</b></li><li>• Difficult to determine appropriate level</li><li>• Risk of domestic legal challenge (non-exempted industry)</li><li>• Loss of tax revenue</li><li>• Contrary to PP Principe</li></ul>	Japan, South Africa, Switzerland
Reduced rates			Sweden, France
Rebates on carbon tax payments			Denmark, Ireland, Finland
Offsets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Incentive for emission reductions in uncovered sectors</li><li>• Incentivize private investment in emission reductions</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Administratively complex</li><li>• Reduced tax revenues</li></ul>	Mexico, South Africa

# CARBON TAX DESIGN

## MRV & ADMINISTRATION

**MRV & Administration influence each of the decisions**

DECISION	MRV & ADMINISTRATION FACTORS
Sectors and activities	Preexisting systems for monitoring inputs outputs or transactions Preexisting systems for tax collection and administrations Number of participants in different sectors Emissions factors in different sectors
Point of regulation	Number of emitters at different points of taxation Preexisting MRV or tax administration at different points of taxation Capacity of emitters to undertake M&R of emissions
Level of reporting	Access of different entities to data for M&R
Thresholds	Share of small emitters in covered sectors Capacity of emitters to undertake M&R of emissions M&R their emissions for tax reporting purposes or only fuel use/sales ?

# UNWANTED EFFECTS

## ADDRESS UNWANTED EFFECTS

### Measures to address leakage and distributional risks

Measure	Pros	Cons	Examples
Output-based rebates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Strong leakage protection</b></li><li>• Retain price signal</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Uncertain cost to public budget</li><li>• Significant MRV</li><li>• Reduce incentive to shift to other products</li></ul>	Sweden
Support programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Popular w/h industry groups</b></li><li>• Retain signal price</li><li>• Offer additional emission reduction incentive</li><li>• Flexible in design</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Costly to public budget</li></ul>	South Africa, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland
Other tax reductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Retain price signal</li><li>• Potential for net positive effect on business and economy</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Cost to public budget</li><li>• Difficult to target directly at affected entities</li></ul>	France
Flat payments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Retain price signal</li><li>• Simple to claim</li><li>• Popular with general public</li><li>• Potential for net positive social and eco. Benefits</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Cost to public budget</li></ul>	

# UNWANTED EFFECTS

## ADDRESS UNWANTED EFFECTS

### Measures to address leakage only

Measure	Pros	Cons	Examples
Border carbon tax adjustments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Maintain price signal for domestic industry</li><li>• Prevent free-riding (companies from non taxing jurisdictions)</li><li>• No pressure on public budgets</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Politically unpopular (risk damaging international relations / WTO )</li><li>• Administratively challenging</li><li>• Potential negative impacts on importers</li></ul>	California ETS
Tax-coordinating measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Retain domestic price signal</li><li>• Leverages domestic carbon price to encourage carbon pricing in partner jurisdictions</li><li>• No domestic administration needs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Difficult to negotiate across many countries</li></ul>	